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Abstract
The call to supplement the quantum wave function with local be-
ables is almost as old as quantum mechanics. But what exactly is the
problem with the wave function as the representation of a quantum
system? I canvass three potential problems with the wave function:
the well-known problems of incompleteness and dimensionality, and
the lesser known problem of non-locality introduced recently by Myr-
vold. Building on Myrvolds insight, I show that the standard ways of
introducing local beables into quantum mechanics are unsuccessful. I
consider whether we really need local beables, and assess the prospects
for a new theory of local beables.
Keywords: Wave function, locality, hidden variables, spontaneous
collapse, many worlds, retrocausation, conguration space, Humean
supervenience
1 The call for local beables
Forty years ago this year, J. S. Bell gave a talk called The Theory of Local
Beables.1 In it, he introduces the term beableas a name for a putative
element of reality in the quantum world, and suggests that the beables we
1At the sixth GIFT seminar, Jaca, Spain, 27 June 1975. The paper is published in
Bell (2004, 5262).
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should be particularly interested in are local in the sense that they can be
assigned to some bounded space-time region (Bell 2004, 53). But even if the
term originates with Bell, the call for local beables clearly echoes the EPR
argument exactly forty years prior to that (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen
1935). The motivation is essentially the same: the wave function via which
standard quantummechanics represents physical systems is inadequate to the
task, and hence needs to be supplemented with (or replaced by) something
that genuinely represents the properties of the system.
The need for local beables remains controversial, and any particular ac-
count of them doubly so. My sense is that the debate itself is not terribly
clearly dened. What, precisely, is the problem with the wave function that
calls for the addition of local beables? What exactly would count as a local
beable? And how far do the various accounts of local beables on o¤er succeed
at solving the problems with the wave function representation? My present
purpose is to try to make a little headway in answering these questions.
Let me start with the question of motivation. Whats wrong with the
wave function anyway? There are a number of concerns one might have.
First, theres the EPR worry that the description of reality provided by the
wave function is incomplete. The argument here is that since measuring one
of a pair of entangled particles allows you to predict with certainty the out-
come for the other particle, the latter particle must already have a property
corresponding to the outcome of the measurement and the wave function
doesnt represent that property. Bell, of course, complicates this discussion
by proving that any method of ascribing properties to entangled systems
would have to violate some highly plausible physical assumption, e.g. causal
locality. But his concern is essentially the same as Einsteins: we need local
beables because the wave function is representationally incomplete.
The representational incompleteness of the wave function is not limited to
entangled states, however. Schrödingers cat thought experiment highlights a
dilemma facing accounts of quantum mechanical measurement (Schrödinger
1935 also 80 years old this year!). Either you say that a measurement pre-
cipitates a collapse of the wave function in which case you face the di¢ cult
task of dening just which physical processes constitute measurements or
else you dont in which case there is nothing in the wave function represen-
tation corresponding to the unique outcome of the measurement. This is one
way of expressing the measurement problem.
But representational incompleteness isnt the only concern you might have
with the wave function. Another concern raised by Bell is that the wave
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function propagates not in 3-space, but in 3N -space (2004, 128). That
is, the wave function for an N -particle system is a function of 3N spatial
coordinates: it inhabits a conguration space rather than ordinary three-
dimensional space. Again, this problem takes a particularly stark form when
the state of the system is entangled, since the wave function of the pair of
particles in six-dimensional space cant be reduced to two wave functions in
three-dimensional space without loss of information. But the problem is quite
general: presumably the measurement outcomes we observe are localized in
ordinary three-dimensional space, and the high-dimensional wave function
doesnt directly represent such things. If we are to nd the familiar three-
dimensional world represented in the wave function, we need to be told how.
Finally, as Myrvold (2014) has recently remarked, even in its own 3N -
dimensional space the wave function is an inherently non-local representation
of a system, in the following sense: a non-zero wave function amplitude in
some region (of 3N -space) is incompatible with the squared wave function
amplitude integrating to 1 over any disjoint region. Hence a non-zero ampli-
tude in one region of 3N -space carries implications for the amplitude right
now in any region of 3N -space, however distant. It seems reasonable to think
that the properties of the system in my lab are local (in three-dimensional
space) in the sense that they carry no implications for the properties of the
far side of the moon right now. Of course, the properties of the system in my
lab might carry implications for the properties of the far side of the moon
later, via causal processes, but the non-locality at issue here is denitional
rather than causal.2 That is, the wave function cannot be dened over a
bounded region even of 3N -dimensional space without reference to the rest
of the space, because the normalization of the wave function refers to all of
the space.
For ease of reference, let us call these three problems with the wave func-
tion incompleteness, dimensionality and non-locality. Of course, not everyone
is convinced that these are genuine problems that need to be solved. (Nor
are they strictly independent problems: they interrelate in various ways to
2There are three senses of locality to keep straight here. There is Bells sense: a
beable is local in some space i¤ it can be assigned to a bounded region of that space. Let
us call this ontological locality. There is Myrvolds sense: a beable is local in some space
i¤ it can be dened over a bounded region of that space, without reference to the rest
of the space. Let us call this denitional locality. And nally there is causal locality: a
causal process is local i¤ it can be ascribed to a time-like trajectory. I will endeavor to
specify which I mean.
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be considered below, and they all in some way implicate the representational
completeness of the wave function.) But suppose you are impressed by some
or all of these concerns. It seems that you must supplement (or even replace)
the wave function as a representation of quantum systems; you must invent
a new theory. And of course there is no shortage of contenders.
2 Incompleteness
Several attempts have been made to add local beables to quantum mechan-
ics, most notably hidden variable theories in the style of Bohm (1952), and
spontaneous collapse theories in the style of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber
(1986). Bohms theory supplements the wave function with particles that
are pushed aroundby the wave function. These particles are local in Bells
ontological sense: the beables are the particle positions (at a time), which can
be assigned to space-time points.3 The GRW theory supplements standard
quantum mechanics with a spontaneous collapse mechanism that postulates
a small chance per unit time per particle that the wave function will become
localized in the coordinates of that particle. The local beables are a little
harder to discern here: the localization is imperfect, in the sense that a wave
function that is non-zero everywhere before collapse will still be non-zero
everywhere after collapse. But as Bell (2004, 205) notes, the center-point of
a collapse event can be regarded as a local beable in his ontological sense:
the collapse event can be regarded as assigning a property to a space-time
point. This is the ashyontology for GRW endorsed by Tumulka (2006).
Alternatively, one can supplement the wave function of GRW with a mass
density distribution over three-dimensional space, dened so that the mass
density is large where the squared wave function amplitude is large (Ghirardi,
Grassi and Benatti 1995; Allori et al. 2008). In this massyontology for
GRW, the beables are mass density assignments to space-time points.
Both of these theories are most directly aimed at the incompleteness prob-
lem. In Bohms theory, the positions of the particles represent the outcomes
of our measurements, without the need for collapse. So even though the
wave function does not represent the unique outcome of a measurement, the
particle positions perform this job. In the GRW theory there are collapses,
3I take the beables to be local properties rather than local objects. But for the purposes
of this paper I dont want to make anything of the property/object distinction: hopefully
it doesnt matter.
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but there is no need for a problematic collapse-on-measurement postulate,
because measurements automatically precipitate collapse: when a quantum
system is correlated with a macroscopic pointer, the sheer number of parti-
cles involved means that a spontaneous collapse is almost certain in a very
small period of time. In the case of the ashy ontology, the location of the
initial collapse event picks out the unique outcome of the measurement, and
in the case of the massy ontology, the collapse event means that the mass
density is concentrated on one outcome.4
Similar stories are available for entangled states, although the solution
to the incompleteness problem for such states is less than satisfactory. In
Bohms theory, a measurement on one particle can determine the prop-
erties of both particles. So, for example, although Bohmian particles al-
ways have determinate position properties, they do not always have de-
terminate spin properties, and for an entangled pair in the singlet state
2 1=2 (j"zi1 j#zi2   j#zi1 j"zi2), a z-spin measurement on either particle causes
the Bohmian particles to move within the wave function so as to x the spin
properties of both particles. The particle positions succeed at representing
the outcomes of our measurements, but in this case a causally non-local in-
uence between the two particles is required as part of the explanation. In
the GRW theory, a measurement on either particle in the singlet state pre-
cipitates a wave function collapse centered on one term or the other either
on j"zi1 j#zi2 or on j#zi1 j"zi2 and hence both particles acquire determinate
spin values. The evolution of the wave function explains the outcomes we ob-
serve, but again a causally non-local inuence is involved in the explanation
of the outcomes. The beables introduced by Bohms theory and the GRW
theory are ontologically local they reside at well-dened points but the
laws that direct them are causally non-local. Hence these theories succeed
at solving the incompleteness problem for entangled states, but at the cost
of introducing causal non-locality.
3 Dimensionality
Bohms theory and the GRW theory were devised to solve the incomplete-
ness problem. But what about the other problems with the wave function?
4Worries can be raised about the adequacy of both Bohms theory and the GRW
theory in explaining measurement results (e.g. Brown and Wallace 2005; Cordero 1999).
But these worries can, I think, be addressed (Lewis 2007).
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Prima facie, both Bohms theory and the GRW theory provide a solution
to the dimensionality problem. Bohmian particles always have determinate
locations in ordinary three-dimensional space, even when the wave func-
tion requires a higher-dimensional representation. Similarly, the ashes of
ashy GRW always have determinate locations in three-dimensional space,
and the mass density of massy GRW is distributed in a determinate way
over three-dimensional space, even when the wave function cannot be repre-
sented in such a space. Hence the ontology in all three cases is undeniably
three-dimensional.
But there still is a remaining dimensionality problem. In Bohms theory,
the dynamical law for the particles is such that their motion depends on
the wave function: this is the sense in which the wave function pushes
aroundthe particles. But if the wave function inhabits a high-dimensional
conguration space, and the particles inhabit a separate 3-space, it is hard
to see how the wave function can push around the particles. Similarly in
the GRW theory, the ashes and the mass density distribution have a law-
like connection to the wave function, and hence the evolution of ashes or
mass density over time depends on the evolution of the wave function over
time. But since the wave function inhabits one space and the ashes or
mass density inhabit another, it is hard to see how the dependence of one on
the other could be mediated. This is a separate issue from the causal non-
locality just mentioned; it is not that the causation involved here operates
instantaneously across space, it is that it apparently operates between two
distinct spaces.
There are two general approaches one might take to dealing with this
residual problem. First, one might postulate that all the ontology of the
relevant theory lives in the high-dimensional space. That is, the Bohmian
particles for an N -particle system are really just a manner of speaking about
a single point in a 3N -dimensional space, a point that accounts for the out-
comes of our measurements. Similarly, GRW collapses are events that con-
centrate the wave function amplitude around a single location in 3N -space,
again accounting for the results of our measurements (without any appeal to
three-dimensional ontology such as ashes or a mass density distribution).
Albert (1996) has endorsed such an account. The main challenge here is
to explain how events in a fundamentally 3N -dimensional space can yield
the appearance that the measurement outcomes we observe are situated in
3-dimensional space. Albert is happy to take on that explanatory burden,
although the extent to which he succeeds is a matter of ongoing debate (Ney
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and Albert 2013).
The other approach is to postulate that all the ontology of the relevant
theory lives in three-dimensional space. The most prominent proposals for
achieving this point beyond the connes of non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics. For instance, Goldstein and Zanghì (2013) postulate that in the context
of a quantum theory that can incorporate gravity, the time-dependence of
the wave function may drop out, and hence the wave function may function
as a constant law rather than as a time-evolving entity. This opens up the
possibility that the ontology of Bohms theory consists entirely of particles
in 3-space evolving according to this law. If tenable, this proposal rescues
three-dimensional local beables (in Bells ontological sense) in the context of
Bohms theory. But quantum gravity is rather speculative territory: there
is no settled theory yet, so it is unclear whether quantum gravity really has
the consequence of a static wave function, and it is doubtful whether the
laws that would push around the Bohmian particles in such a theory could
be made causally local.5
Putting aside such speculation, Wallace and Timpson (2010) and Myrvold
(2014) argue that the wave function of non-relativistic quantum mechanics
reduces to local properties of the three-dimensional eld in quantum eld
theory, and hence the ontology of quantummechanics is fundamentally three-
dimensional, with the conguration-space wave function simply acting as a
convenient shorthand representation in the non-relativistic limit.6
Except for Goldstein and Zanghìs proposal, what the remaining responses
to the residual dimensionality problem have in common is that they essen-
tially give up on the demand for ontologically local beables beables that
can be assigned to a bounded region of 3-space. If the ontology of quantum
mechanics is fundamentally high-dimensional, then the beables are assigned
to a bounded region of the high-dimensional space, but not necessarily to
a bounded region of the three-dimensional world as it appears to us. For
example, in Bohms theory our measurement outcomes are explained via a
single point in the high-dimensional space, but in general this point can cor-
respond to locations indenitely far apart in the three-dimensional space of
5Bells theorem suggests that any theory of ontologically local beables must be causally
non-local (Bell 1964). Many worlds theories and retrocausal theories might evade this
conclusion; they are discussed below.
6It is worth noting, though, that neither Wallace and Timpson nor Myrvold are at-
tempting to defend either a Bohmian or a spontaneous collapse theory, since their sympa-
thies lie with the Everettian approach described in the next section.
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experience. Similarly in the GRW theory, our measurement outcomes are
explained by a wave function that is strongly peaked around a point in the
high-dimensional space, but which may correspond to locations indenitely
far apart in three-dimensional space. And even if the fundamental ontol-
ogy is three-dimensional, entanglement means that some of the properties of
quantum systems are irreducibly relational, applying equally to two or more
locations in three-dimensional space (Wallace and Timpson 2010, 713).
The lesson that Wallace and Timpson (2010) and Myrvold (2014) draw is
that local beables are unnecessary: this is explored later. But there may be
philosophical reasons to prefer beables that are ontologically local in a high-
dimensional space rather than no local beables at all, and hence to prefer the
high-dimensional ontology to the three-dimensional one. For example, Barry
Loewer (1996) defends a high-dimensional ontology for quantum mechanics
on the grounds that it allows us to retain Humean supervenience David
Lewiss doctrine that all the properties of a system supervene on the local
properties of its smallest parts. However, there is one further problem to
consider, and it suggests that Loewers defense of Humean supervenience
may be misguided.
4 Non-locality
The remaining problem is Myrvolds non-locality problem the problem that
a non-zero squared wave function amplitude in one location has implications
for the squared wave function amplitude at distant locations. As Myrvold
notes, the move to a high-dimensional space is no help here: if the squared
wave function amplitude is non-zero in some region of conguration space,
then it cannot be the case that it integrates to 1 over some disjoint region of
conguration space (2014, 4). Wave function properties may be ontologically
local in their own high-dimensional space, but even in that space, they are
not denitionally local.
The reason that this is signicant is that Humean supervenience is ordi-
narily taken to be a commitment to both ontological and denitional locality:
beables should be ascribable to one region of the relevant space without ref-
erence to other regions. Wave function properties fail this requirement: you
cannot ascribe amplitude properties to points in this region of 3N -space how-
ever you like, because the amplitude properties in some other region might
rule out some assignments to this region. If the integral of the squared wave
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function amplitude over some distant region is close to 1, then it cannot also
be close to 1 over this region.
To the extent that Bohms theory and the GRW theory rely on the wave
function as part of their ontology, they su¤er from this problem. If the single
point representing the Bohmian particles is located in a particular region
of conguration space, then the squared wave function amplitude must be
non-zero in that region, and hence cant integrate to 1 elsewhere. If a GRW
collapse occurs to a given region of conguration space, then the squared
wave function amplitude is again non-zero in that region, and hence cannot
integrate to 1 elsewhere.
You might think that the violation of denitional locality is just a truism:
if my desk is here, then trivially my desk is not anywhere else. But the
point is that Humean supervenience requires that local properties carry no
implications for other regions of space. The fact that my desk is here carries
no implications for whether there is a desk (or anything else) in the next o¢ ce
over. But the fact that the squared wave function amplitude is non-zero here
does restrict its values elsewhere.
It is tempting to think that the non-locality identied by Myrvold rests on
a mistaken understanding of the normalization of the wave function. Because
of its connection to probability via the Born rule, the squared amplitude of
the wave function must integrate to 1 over the whole of space. But if the
wave function is regarded as an entity spread over 3N -space, presumably it
describes the distribution of some kind of stu¤ over that space, and then one
might think that normalization is just a fact about the proportion of wave
function stu¤ in a particular region, not the absolute quantity. Suppose that
there is some quantity of wave function stu¤ located in this region of 3N -
space. This carries no implications, one might think, for how much wave
function stu¤ is located elsewhere, so Humean supervenience is safe. The
only implication is that if there is a lot of wave function stu¤ elsewhere,
then the proportion of squared wave function amplitude in this region is low,
and if there is only a little elsewhere then the proportion here is high.
But this hope is short-lived. Such a proposal wouldnt give you any
kind of Humean supervenience worth having, because the beables in a region
would be radically disconnected from what you should expect to observe if
you look at the region. If there is a lot of wave function stu¤ elsewhere, then
the probability of nding the system in this region is low, and if there is a
little, then it is high. We want the beables to explain what we observe, and
the current proposal fails that test.
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Along similar lines, you might propose that the normalization condition
is a contingent initial condition (Albert 1996, 278): it just so happens that
there is a certain amount of wave function stu¤distributed over conguration
space, and the Schrödinger equation means that the squared wave function
amplitude is conserved over time. But while this might serve as a kind of
explanation of denitional non-locality, it doesnt eliminate it. Compare this
with ordinary conservation laws. In classical mechanics, if the universe is
created with a certain amount of mass in it, then the amount of mass in
one region carries implications for the amount of mass elsewhere. There is
no violation of Humean supervenience: there could have been more mass
elsewhere without a¤ecting the amount of mass we can observe here. But in
the quantum case, as explained above, if there had been more wave function
stu¤elsewhere, then the probabilities associated with our observations in this
region would have been di¤erent. That is, keeping xed the probabilities of
various observations here, there couldnt have been more wave function stu¤
elsewhere.
Alternatively, one might think that Myrvolds non-locality problem is just
an artifact of considering only non-relativistic systems with a xed number
of particles. If there are N particles in the system, and there are N particles
in this region (either because of Bohmian particle beables or GRW wave
function beables), then it cannot be the case that there are any particles
elsewhere. But it is unfair to suggest that this is a violation of Humean
supervenience, one might think, because the constraint that there are exactly
N particles in the world is a global fact about the world, and combining local
beables with a global fact can certainly have non-local implications.
But in fact the normalization of the quantum state carries straightfor-
ward non-local implications even when there is not a xed number of parti-
cles (Myrvold 2014, 16). Suppose the (Bohmian or GRW) beables are such
that there is exactly one particle in a given region of space.7 This means
that at least some of the squared amplitude is associated with one particle
being in this region, and this rules out the possibility that all the squared
amplitude is associated with nding exactly three particles (or whatever) in
some distant region of space. Hence the beables still carry non-local impli-
cations: normalization is the culprit, not the assumption of a xed number
of particles.
7I dont wish to imply here that it is straightforward or even possible to extend Bohms
theory or the GRW theory to the relativistic domain.
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The only way I can see for avoiding this kind of denitional non-locality
for making quantummechanics over 3N -space consistent with Humean super-
venience is the possibility that we may be able regard the wave function as
a law rather than an entity, as described in the previous section. But it is
worth noting that in that case the move to a high-dimensional space does no
work: if the wave function is a law governing the evolution of beables, those
beables may as well live in three dimensions. The move to a high-dimensional
space is not a way to recover Humean supervenience.
So it looks like attempts to introduce local beables dont get us as far
as we might have liked. While Bohms theory and the GRW theory o¤er a
direct solution to the incompleteness problem, they do so at the expense of
introducing causal non-locality. And the dimensionality problem and Myr-
volds non-locality problem resist solution, unless some speculation about the
time-dependence of the wave function in quantum gravity pays o¤. Many
commentators are already convinced that the price for local beables namely
instantaneous action at a distance is too high. If we add to that Myrvolds
point that the beables we get arent even fully local (in the denitional sense),
then the price starts to look like money for nothing.
5 Who needs local beables?
Even Bell, the biggest champion of local beables, concedes that we may
be obliged to develop theories in which there are no strictly local beables
(2004, 53). Perhaps the thing to do at this point is to concede that no quan-
tum mechanical theory in terms of local beables is possible that Humean
supervenience is dead. Indeed, if the motivation for local beables is primarily
philosophical to save the doctrine of Humean supervenience then its hard
to see that much is lost: this is just another example of a philosophical intu-
ition that falls to empirical science. But Bell and Einstein were not primarily
motivated (if at all) by such intuitions; their concern was with the physical
adequacy of the theory in light of the incompleteness problem. Bohm and
GRW deliver this much at least.
Can we do better? So far I have said nothing about the many worlds
theory the third of the big threeinterpretations. According to its advo-
cates, the many worlds theory can solve the incompleteness problem without
recourse to Bohmian particles or GRW collapses. The trick is that a struc-
ture of decoherent branches is identied in the wave function, and beables
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representing the outcomes of measurements are identied within each branch.
That is, if the z-spins of two particles the singlet state 2 1=2 (j"zi1 j#zi2   j#zi1 j"zi2)
are measured, then decoherent branches are produced, relative to some of
which the state is close to j"zi1 j#zi2, and relative to others of which the state
is close to j#zi1 j"zi2. Hence (its advocates conclude), the wave function itself
can provide all the beables we need, and there never was an incompleteness
problem in quantum mechanics.
The many worlds theory also works just as well as Bohm and GRW (if
not better) at tackling the dimensionality problem. The wave function in
the many worlds theory is interpreted realistically, and taken at face value
it occupies a high-dimensional conguration space. One could try to sup-
plement the wave function with ontology that resides in three-dimensional
space (Allori et al. 2011), but that would raise the worries about interaction
mentioned in section 3. So the relevant options seem the same as before: ei-
ther defend the idea that reality is fundamentally high-dimensional, or show
how the wave function can be interpreted as representing properties in three-
dimensional space.
So the many worlds theory gives us beables, beables that solve the incom-
pleteness problem, and address the dimensionality problem as far as it needs
addressing. But it doesnt give us local beables in the denitional sense: the
non-locality problem applies just as readily to the many worlds theory as to
Bohm and GRW. Suppose for example, that my branch of the wave function
is such that there is a particle in a particular region of space. This requires
that most of the wave function amplitude in this branch is contained in the
relevant region in the coordinates of the particle. And this in turn rules out
most of the wave function amplitude in this branch being contained in some
distant region of space.8 Humean supervenience is not regained.
Myrvold (2014) and Wallace and Timpson (2010) are quite sanguine
about the non-local nature of the beables in the many worlds theory. They
can certainly be purchased far more cheaply than the non-local beables in
Bohm and GRW: there is (arguably) no need for instantaneous action at a
distance (Wallace and Timpson 2010, 713). And it looks like no interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics that connects the beables to the quantum state
can do better: Myrvolds non-locality problem follows from the normaliza-
tion of the quantum state, so any interpretation in which the beables carry
8Sometimes my branchwill not be dened for su¢ ciently distant regions of space.
But let us assume a scenario and a distant region for which it is dened.
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implications for the quantum state will su¤er from this problem.
Still, there is something quite strange about the source of the non-locality.
Bohms theory, the GRW theory and the many worlds theory are all real-
ist about the quantum state: the wave function describes the distribution
of something physical over (ordinary or conguration) space. Normaliza-
tion is an odd requirement to impose on the distribution of physical stu¤.
Explanatory strategies such as regarding normalization as the product of a
conservation law are inadequate, as shown in the previous section. What it
looks like of course given the Born rule is an epistemic constraint, since
our degrees of belief should always sum to 1. It is strange that an epistemic
constraint should act on the world.
Perhaps this is a tendentious way of putting things. Contemporary many-
worlders like Wallace (2012) might say that I get things backwards: the
normalization of the wave function is a constraint on the world, and while
it might be prima facie strange that it should correspond so directly to a
constraint on my beliefs, there are decision-theoretic arguments why this
should be so. Still, the decision-theoretic arguments remain controversial,9
and the source of the normalization constraint remains mysterious.
6 Restoring local beables
Of course, strangeness is no real objection to a theory, especially one like
many worlds quantum mechanics. But if we like to have things explained,
then it would be better if we could construe the wave function epistemically,
since then the normalization constraint has a straightforward explanation.
As a side e¤ect, this also restores the possibility of defending Humean super-
venience, since Myrvolds non-locality problem doesnt arise. But epistemic
construals of the wave function face formidable obstacles, most notably a
number of no-go theorems (Bell 1964; Kochen and Specker 1967; Pusey, Bar-
rett and Rudolph 2012).10
9See e.g. the essays in Part IV of Saunders et al. (2010).
10Of course, the no-go theorems apply equally to theories in which the wave function is
an entity: they constrain property ascription in many worlds theories, for example. But
Everettians can shrug their shoulders of course you cant ascribe pre-measurement prop-
erties to systems corresponding to their unique outcomes, because measurements typically
dont have unique outcomes. Epistemic views typically entail that the wave function rep-
resents our knowledge of pre-existing properties that are revealed on measurement; this
is precisely the picture that the theorems make trouble for. Gri¢ ths (2011) argues that
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One way forward is to exploit the so-called independence loophole in
the no-go theorems. As Price (1994) and Leifer (2011) point out, the no-
go theorems all assume that the properties of a system are independent of
the measurements performed on it. This assumption might be violated if
causation were a time-symmetric phenomenon if particles could carry the
e¤ects of later measurements performed on them, just as they carry the
e¤ects of earlier measurements. Then there is no barrier, in principle, to the
wave function playing a purely epistemic role, where the ontology consists of
particles and their local properties.
So for example, when we describe a pair of particles using the singlet
state 2 1=2 (j"zi1 j#zi2   j#zi1 j"zi2), this simply means that owing to the way
the particles were produced, we dont know (prior to z-spin measurements
on the individual particles) whether particle 1 is z-spin-up and particle 2
is z-spin-down or vice versa. Nevertheless, one of these is the case: the
particles have well-dened individual spin properties. The reason this doesnt
violate Bells theorem is that the spin values depend on the measurements
performed: if spin measurements in di¤erent directions had been performed
on the particles, then their earlier spin properties would have been di¤erent.
A retrocausal interpretation of quantum mechanics of this kind means
that the local beables are precisely the properties of the particles revealed on
measurement in this case, their spins. This has a number of advantages.
Clearly, the incompleteness problem doesnt arise: particles have pre-existing
properties corresponding to the results of our measurements, and the fact that
the wave function doesnt represent those properties is of no consequence,
because the wave function just represents our knowledge of the system. Sim-
ilarly, the particles and their properties reside in three-dimensional space,
so the dimensionality problem doesnt arise either. The fact that the wave
function is dened over conguration space simply reects the complexities
of our knowledge of quantum systems: for entangled systems like the pair of
particles in the singlet state, we not only know the possible spin properties for
each particle individually, we also know the correlations between them in
this case that they have opposite spins when measured in any given direction.
This information is most readily represented in a conguration space.
Finally, Myrvolds non-locality problem doesnt arise in a retrocausal the-
ory. Suppose a particle is located in a particular region of space. Nothing
Bells theorem doesnt threaten epistemic views, understood correctly, but Maudlin (2011)
responds that Gri¢ ths misidenties the aw in Bells reasoning.
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follows about the beables in distant regions of space: maybe there is a par-
ticle there, maybe there isnt. The normalization of the wave function is
irrelevant here, because there is no general connection between the location
of the particle (a fact about the world) and the wave function (a description
of our knowledge). It is true that if we restrict ourselves to systems with a
xed number of particles (as in non-relativistic quantum mechanics), then
the fact that there is a particle here does have implications for how many par-
ticles there are elsewhere but in the retrocausal case it is clearly the global
assumption about the number of particles that introduces the non-locality.
Without the assumption of a xed number of particles (as in quantum eld
theory) the location of a particle carries no implications for distant regions.
The fact that there is a particle here does not by itself entail that there is a
non-zero wave function amplitude here, because I might be convinced that
there is no particle here.
However, suppose I do ascribe a non-zero probability to the particle be-
ing located here. Then the wave function amplitude will be non-zero in this
region, which carries the implication that the squared wave function ampli-
tude does not integrate to 1 over some distant region. But this apparent
non-locality is just a matter of what credences I can simultaneously enter-
tain: if I have a non-zero credence that there is a particle here, then I cannot
also have credences totalling to 1 in possibilities that exclude a particle being
here. Nothing follows about whether or not there is a particle in any distant
region. Normalization applies to my credences, not to the world.
All these advantages are purchased without paying the price of instanta-
neous action at a distance: all action is along time-like lines, although some
of that action is in the reverse temporal direction. So if a genuine, fully-
edged retrocausal theory of quantum mechanics were available, it would be
an attractive contender. But unfortunately there is as yet no such thing,
although there are a number of ongoing research programs. The sticking
place, as one might expect, is interference: if the wave function is purely
epistemic, how can it exhibit interference e¤ects? While some suggestions
concerning the origin of interference e¤ects in wave-function-epistemic the-
ories have been made (e.g. Price 1996, 255; Spekkens 2007), others have
concluded that waves have an ineliminable role even in retrocausal theories
(Wharton 2010; Kastner 2012). It remains to be seen how this all plays out,
and whether local beables remain viable.
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